Week 6 Bolg Post

Week 6 Blog Post

Comments on Major Problems in the Civil War and Reconstruction Documents and Essays:

Document 1: General McClellan’s Harrison’s Landing letter amply illustrated the contempt McClellan held for Lincoln even though his actual choice of language was respectful. It is truly amazing that McClellan would think that he needed to tell the president that “the Constitution and the Union must be preserved.” (Perman and Taylor, 140) He also should not have had to tell the president that the Union was in a “War” a year after the fighting began. McClellan was living in a fantasy world if he thought that the Union armies would respect Southern private property and leave it in tact. This had been Lincoln’s intention a year earlier, but he realized that it was no longer practical.

I did not understand exactly what McClellan meant by the statement, “[Y]ou will require a Commander in Chief of the Army …” (P & T, 141). By the Constitution, Pres. Lincoln was Commander in Chief of all the military. By the time of the letter, July 7, 1862, Lincoln had already made McClellan Chief of Staff.

I thought it was interesting that McClellan closed his letter with, “Very respectfully your obdt svt [obedient servant] when he disobeyed Lincoln’s orders to attack on several occasions. (P & T, 141)

Document 2: I noticed that the General Orders, No. 75 document from General Lee was actually written by his assistant general, Chilton, referring to Lee in the third person. The letter switched to second person in the last paragraph so that it could thank the soldiers directly. General Lee gave thanks to God for the victory in battle in keeping with a tradition that dates back thousands of years in Western Civilization. That opening sentence seems to contradict itself. God is “the only Giver of all the victory,” yet it was the “valor” of Lee’s men that made it all possible. (P & T, 142)

Document 3: Gen. Lee’s letter to Pres. Davis was much more appropriate than Gen. McClellan’s letter above. Lee’s subject outlined a specific battle strategy which was in keeping with his position as commanding general. He supported his position with outlines of the conditions within both armies. He was also implicitly asking for Davis’ permission to undertake the offensive. Lee’s signing of his letter, “your ob’t servant” is more believable than with McClellan. (P & T, 143-44)

Document 4: This letter is a good example of Gen. Grant’s battle strategy. He gave detailed instructions to Gen. Meade about the coordination of troops under different commanders.

Document 5: Grant memoirs show that he remembered the Overland campaign as a standoff with inevitably high losses on either side. It gives a grim indication that Grant was aware of the high death toll on both sides that had not accomplished much towards ending the war as of mid-1864. (P & T, 146)

Document 6: I find it interesting that Gen. Sherman even took the time to respond in writing to a petition by the mayor of Atlanta. I don’t know the actual events of Sherman’s march because we haven’t gotten that far in this course yet. From the letter, it seems that Sherman gave the citizens of Atlanta notice to evacuate the city so that they wouldn’t be wounded or killed when his army came through. He did not apologize for any of the hardships of war and basically blames the people of Atlanta for bringing the war upon themselves by Georgia taking part in the secession. He told them that they must admit the error of their ways in order to end the war. He is willing to destroy the city in order to force them into obeying “the laws of the United States.” (P & T, 147-48) Sherman emphasized that he is just doing his duty as a Union officer. To reinforce that concept, he asserted that once peace has been achieved (meaning after Georgia rejoins the Union), Sherman will defend Atlanta’s “homes and families against danger from any quarter.” (P & T, 148)

Document 7: I noticed that General Grant referred to the war as “the rebellion” in his report made at the end of the war.  He noted that he surmised from the beginning that peace between the North and South would not come from diplomatic negotiations. Only after the South had been defeated militarily would peace be possible. (P & T, 148-49) He admitted that it was a problem that the Union armies of the East and West did not work together which gave the enemy an advantage. Grant realized that his actions were apt to be criticized the most by those who lost loved ones or property in the war, but that he served to the best of his ability.

Essay 1: Gallagher made a good point that armies “operate within a complicated web of military, political, and social constraints.” (P& T, 150) As such, he gave a good summary of influencing factors leading up to the Richmond campaign. I found his argument convincing for why the Eastern Theater battles received more attention and significance from the public. It is interesting to learn that Pres. Lincoln was not happy with that fact since he necessarily had to view the war as a whole in order to preserve the Union. He highlighted the Northern political divide over emancipation. As the Richmond campaign approached, the North expected to continue their victories while the South was demoralized from losses. Another of Gallagher’s insights was that Lee took over the Richmond campaign without the benefit of public confidence in his abilities as McClellan had. Paradoxically, McClellan was the one undeserving of such confidence when he retreated from the offensive. Politics played a leading role since McClellan Democratic political views in addition to his ego caused him to chafe with Pres. Lincoln. It was after the Richmond campaign that McClellan presented Lincoln with his Harrison’s Landing Letter mentioned above. Gallagher noted that after this campaign, Lincoln moved much closer to emancipation.

I also found it interesting that Gen. Lee’s impressive performance at keeping Richmond from falling to Union forces influenced foreign opinion. There was more support in the British Parliament for granting diplomatic recognition to the Confederacy since Lee took command.

Essay 2: I thought that Mark Grimsley’s essay on the Overland Campaign was a good assessment of generalship. (P & T, 162-65) It was difficult to put into context since we do not read about the Overland Campaign in Ordeal by Fire until later (I found it on page 454). The campaign does not take place until the spring of 1864. The discussion of the relationship between generals Grant and Meade was revealing (P & T, 166-67) Also interesting was the brief paragraph on the statistical cost of just one of Grant’s campaigns at $48,000 per day. (P & T, 170) I wonder how much the cost figures were quoted to the public then. We were inundated with cost factors over the Iraq wars, especially the controversial second war. Was it millions per day and billions per month? I don’t remember. I only remember wishing the money had been spent at home in the U.S. or saved in the treasury. At least during the Civil War, the money was spent on trying to preserve our own country although, again, it is unfortunate that the money needed to be spent on war. I suppose the Confederacy would have asserted that the Union (North) could have left them alone to form their separate nation and not engage in a war.

Written by Molly Kettler